Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1987

J. Douglas Jacobsen v. Mollie Kimball : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Milo S. Marsden; Marsden, Orton & Cahoon; Attorney for Respondent.
Edward M. Garrett; Garrett & Sturdy; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jacobsen v. Kimball, No. 870117 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/384

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH u v u
BR^
UTAH
DOCUWIEW

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

J . DOUGLAS JACOBSEN,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 870117-CA

vs.

MOLLIE KIMBALL,

Priority 14b

Defendant/Appellant.

On Appeal From the Circuit Court, State of Utah
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City Department
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, Judge
BRIEF OF APPELLANT MOLLIE KIMBALL

Attorney for Respondent:

Attorney for Appellant:

Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
Marsden, Orton & Cahoon
68 South Main Street
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Edward M.
Garrett &
311 South
Suite 320
Salt Lake

Garrett
Sturdy
State Street
City, UT

84111

JUL 2 V1987
COURT OF APPEALS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

J. DOUGLAS JACOBSEN,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No. 870117-CA

vs.
MOLLIE KIMBALL,

Priority 14b

Defendant/Appellant.

On Appeal From the Circuit Court, State of Utah
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City Department
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, Judge
BRIEF OF APPELLANT MOLLIE KIMBALL

Attorney for Respondent:

Attorney for Appellant:

Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
Marsden, Orton & Cahoon
68 South Main Street
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Edward M.
Garrett &
311 South
Suite 320
Salt Lake

Garrett
Sturdy
State Street
City, UT

84111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
STATUTE
STATEMENT OF CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
Point I:

The Court Erred in Finding
That the $5,700 Car Purchase
Was a Loan Rather Than a Gift

Point II:

The Court Erred in Failing to
Consider the Value of Property
Accumulated During the
Relationship and the Value of
Services Rendered Plaintiff By
Defendant

Point III: The Four-Year Statute of
Limitations is a Bar to the
Action (78-12-25)
CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
Bustamante vs. Bustamante-, 645 P. 2d 40 (Utah)
Garcia vs. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah)
Jenkins vs. Jenkins, 153 P.2d 262 (Utah)
Michelle Marvin vs. Lee Marvin, 557 P.2d 106
(California)
O'Hair vs. Kounalis, 463 P.2d 799 (Utah)
Sharf vs. BMG Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-25
(1953, as amended)

OTHER AUTHORITY
Annotation, When Statute of Limitations Begins
to Run Against Action Based on Unwritten
Promise to Pay Money Where There is No
Condition or Definite Time for Repayment,
14 A.L.R.4th 1385 (1982)

ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

J. DOUGLAS JACOBSEN,
Case No. 870117-CA

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs .

Priority 14b

MOLLIE KIMBALL,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal From the Circuit Court, State of Utah
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City Department
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, Judge

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.-

Did

(Jacobsen)

the

Court

"loaned"

err

in

Defendant

finding

that

(Kimball)

Plaintiff

$5,700.00

to

purchase an automobile?
2.

Was the $5,700.00 a gift?

3.

Did the Court err in failing to consider the value

of current

goods

and

services

furnished

to Jacobsen by

Kimball as an offset to the $5,700.00?
A.
value

Did the Court err in failing to find that the
of

property

returned

by

Kimball

to

Jacobsen

constituted payment or offset to the vehicle purchase?
5.

Is the four-year Statute of Limitations a complete

bar to the action?

STATUTE
78-12-25 U.C.A., 1953:
Within four years:
(1) an action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an
instrument in writing; also on an open
account for goods, wares and merchandise,
and for any article charged in a store
account; also on an open account for work,
labor or services rendered, or materials
furnished; provided, that action in all of
the foregoing cases may be commenced at any
time within four years after the last
charge is made or the last payment is
received.
(2) an action for relief not otherwise
provided for by law.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiff

and

Defendant

became

Defendant Kimball was divorced.

acquainted

in 1979.

Plaintiff Jacobsen was not

divorced at the time, but had been separated from his wife
for a number of years and later became divorced.

Both had

children from their prior marriages, and these children were
in high school or beyond in 1979.

Plaintiff moved into

Defendant's home shortly after they became acquainted and
lived there for five years, at least two years full time and
on weekends during the balance of the time because he worked
out of town.

Marriage was contemplated by the parties but

the relationship terminated in 1984.
During

the

course

of

the

relationship,

Defendant

Kimball provided a home for Plaintiff Jacobsen; paid all the
household

expenses, including
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taxes, utilities and other

payments;

provided

Plaintiff's

beer

upkeep thereon.

all
and

the

food

cigarettes; and

an

in

the home,

automobile

and

All of this was done without any financial

contribution

on

purchase

the automobile.

of

consumed

the

part

of Defendant, except
A joint bank

for

the

account with

Plaintiff was opened and some $8,000.00 was deposited into
that account; an Ed Fraughton sculpture was purchased; a
boat was purchased; and Kimball was given a valuable silver
bullion collection.

All of these items and all funds in the

joint account, except the car, were given to Plaintiff when
the relationship terminated.
This lawsuit stems from a controversy concerning the
automobile.

In early 1981, the parties were looking for an

automobile to replace Kimball's car.

On February 8, 1981, a

suitable car was located and Jacobsen purchased the car for
Kimball for $5,700.00. He sued for that amount on March 27,
1985.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
As first witness, Plaintiff called his daughter, Sallee
Jacobsen Orr.

She testified that at the time of the car

purchase, her father maintained a joint account with her and
that, at his request, on February 8, 1981, she made out a
check to one Wayne Schilling, for $5,700.00 and gave the
check to her father.

Noted on the check is the statement

for "Mollie's car11 (Tr. 14). A copy of the check (Exhibit
1) is appended to this Brief.
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Later, in August 1981 (Tr.18), while Mollie, Jacobsen
and Sallee were riding in the Fiat automobile, there was a
conversation concerning the car.

Sallee was evidently upset

with the fact that her father had purchased Mollie a car and
had never purchased Sallee a car.
a car too.

Sallee felt she deserved

Comments were made and, in response, Mollie said

that she would put money in an account and pay Jacobsen back
in one lump sum.

Jacobsen did not enter the conversation,

but merely told them to "ease up11 (Tr. 24).
Douglas Jacobsen then testified, identifying the check
(Exhibit 1) as being the check he handed to Mollie to buy a
car.

He testified that after the car had been purchased,

there was a discussion about Molliefs

other car and he

testified that Mollie said she would sell the older car and
put the money received on the new car.

Jacobsen responded

by telling her to put the money in an account and when I
need it I'll get it (Tr. 22-23).
He remembered a conversation at the time the older Fiat
was sold where he said he did not need the money, and Mollie
said she would put it in a special account, add to it and
pay him back (Tr. 24). He recalled a conversation of August
1981 where he, Mollie and his daughter were riding in the
new Fiat.

Sallee asked about the money, and Mollie said

that she deserved it, and said further that the money was in
a special account and that she would pay her dad back (Tr.
24).
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After that, nothing was said about the car and the
payments

(Tr. 25).

Jacobsen acknowledged

that there was

never a writing relative to the money for the car being a
loan (Tr. 26).

Carol Gordeen, a social acquaintance of both parties,
testified that they belong to a group that met at each
otherfs homes on weekends (Tr. 55). She recalled the Fiat
automobile and a conversation concerning the car and statements made by Jacobsen.

Her testimony:

Q
(By Mr. Garrett) Just tell us
what you remember, or who you remember
making those statements?
A
Mr. Jacobsen showing the car to
us, this is Molliefs new car, itfs my--you
know, gift to Mollie, I bought this new car
for Mollie.
(Tr. 56)
Mollie
behalf.
July

Kimball

testified

as

a witness

on her

own

She first became acquainted with Mr. Jacobsen in

1979 and

from

that

together in her home.

time until

1984, they resided

He lived with her on a full time

basis for two years and the rest of the time stayed with her
at her home on weekends because he was out of town (Tr. 38).
In 1981, Mollie Kimball was looking for a vehicle to
replace her car.

She and Jacobsen looked at the car that

was purchased, and she asked him to write a check for it,
which he did (Tr. 39). At that time, she had credit with
the credit union at LDS Hospital and would have been able to
-5-

borrow $5,700.00 had she needed to (Tr. 35). At the time
the check was given, he did not make any demand that she pay
it back (Tr. 40).

She, on the other hand, told him she

would give him the money from the sale of her old car (Tr.
40).

When the car was sold, she received

$2,800.00.

approximately

The car was sold within a month or less from the

time the new car was purchased on February 8, 1981 (Tr. 41).
At

the

time

the old

car was

Jacobsen the money received.

sold, Mollie

offered

He responded by saying he

didnft want it and told her to put it in her credit union.
Nothing else was said (Tr. 42).
During

the

period

of

time

that

the

relationship

continued, Mollie made the house payments, paid for the
groceries, paid the utilities, all of the upkeep on the home
(Tr. 36).
copy

of

Exhibit 2, in Mollie Kimball's handwriting, a

which

is

appended

to

this

Brief,

provides

a

breakdown of household expenses provided to Jacobsen from
1979-1984.

This exhibit is uncontraverted and shows $225.00

per month for two years, total $5,400.00; and $20.00 per
weekend

for

three

years, total

$3,120.00; grand

total,

$8,520.00.
Mollie Kimball again referred to Exhibit 2 relative to
personal property that had been given to her by Jacobsen
during the term of their relationship.

In response to a

question about the personal property, she stated:
A
. . . I asked him one time, I
said, it's funny, I work every week, I get
a paycheck and it goes for expenses. You
-6-

work every week and buy investments, and he
said I have you in mind with all of these
things that I buy, I only do it with you in
mind.
(Tr. 51)
This property consisted of an Ed Fraughton bronze sculpture
- $3,500.00; silver bullion - $6,000.00; joint bank account
- $8,000.00; and a boat - $1,200.00 (Exhibit 2).
All of the foregoing money and items of value were
returned

to

Mr.

Jacobsen

relationship terminated.
was

$18,700.00.

by

Mollie

Kimball

the

The total value of the property

Of that amount, Mollie had

$100.00 on the purchase

when

of

the Fraughton

contributed

sculpture and

$800.00 on the boat.

On the question of when the older car was sold and the
$2,800.00

offered

to Jacobsen,

there may

be

an issue.

Jacobsen said:
A
Oh, two--two and a half, maybe
three months, I don't know when.
(Tr. 23)
Mollie Kimball testified:
Q
Do you recall saying at that
time, I put it in the paper and tried to
sell it, I would say within a couple of
months?
A
I think that it was totally sold
by then, it could have been in a month. I
cannot put a date on that, and I told you
before, I tried to get that date, and I
have not been able to come up with it.
(Tr. 52)
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Based upon the facts as set forth above, the Court
found:
1.

That Jacobsen loaned Kimball $5,700.00 to purchase

a car.
2.

That Kimball told Jacobsen she would pay back the

$5,700.00.
3.

That Kimball would pay to Jacobsen the money she

received from the sale of her old car and the balance as she
made it.
4.
Based
judgment

The car was sold within a couple of months.
upon
to

those findings, the lower Court

Jacobsen

in

the

amount

of

awarded

$5,700.00

with

interest from March 10, 1981.
Kimball filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion to
Amend the Findings of Fact to address the following issues:
•1.

The date the Statute of Limitations commenced to

2.

The effect of the reasonable value of the services

run;

and goods provided by Kimball;
3.

The effect and value of the sculpture, bullion,

bank account and boat; and
4.

The value of the use of the vehicle by Jacobsen.

The Court denied

the Motion for New Trial and the

Motion to Amend the Findings, but directed the entry of an
Amended Judgment providing that interest would run only from
the date of Judgment.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Given

the

relationship

of

the

parties

and

the

circumstances surrounding the purchase of the car, the Court
erred in finding that the purchase was a loan of money
rather than a gift.
Jacobsen received food, shelter and care from Kimball
in the uncontested value of $8,520.00 and the return of all
investments of $18,700.00.

The Court erred in not ruling

that a fair division of property had occurred

and that

Jacobsen was not entitled to more by way of a judgment.
This action was commenced over four years after the car
was purchased for Mollie Kimball.

The Court did not address

the Statute of Limitations, although
pled as a defense.

it was specifically

There was no agreement between the

parties as to the time of repayment.

Such being the case,

the Statute commenced on the date the car was purchased, and
the Four-Year Statute of Limitations is a complete bar.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE $5,700 CAR
PURCHASE WAS A LOAN RATHER THAN A GIFT.

When a party attacks the findings of a lower court, the
standard for appellate review is as follows:
"The standard for appellate review of factual
findings affords great deference to the trial
court's view of the evidence unless the trial
court has misapplied the law or its findings are
clearly against the weight of the evidence."
Garcia vs. Schwendiman 645 P2d 651 (Utah).
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A more strident view of the same rule is contained in
Sharf vs. BMG Corporation 700 P2d 1068.
To mount a successful attack on the trial
court's findings of fact, an appellate must
marshall all the evidence in support of the
trial court's findings and then demonstrate that
even viewing it in the light most favorable to
the court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings.
The same rule does not apply in an equity case.
In equity cases our scope of review is broad,
and this court may weigh the evidence and
determine the facts. Bustamante vs. Bustamante
645 P2d 40 (Utah).
This

case

presents

an

interesting

whether it is in fact a law or equity case.

question

as

to

At the time of

the transaction giving rise to this lawsuit, the parties
were living together virtually as husband and wife.

The

many transactions between them, such as the car, the joint
bank account, the purchase of the sculpture, the purchase of
the boat, the receipt of the silver bullion, the providing
of food, shelter and care for a number of years, all point
to the type of transactions occurring between husband and
wife and not the single transaction between those dealing at
arms' length.

All of the transactions, including the car,

must be considered.

So considered, it is the equitable

standard that should be applied in this case, rather than
the law standard.

However, even under the law standard, the

findings of the Court are not supported by the evidence.
The question as to property rights between parties who
live together, although unmarried, has not been determined
-10-

by the Utah Courts and there is no statute on the subject.
California has addressed this matter in many cases. All are
cited and a rule formulated in the case of Michelle Marvin
vs. Lee Marvin 557 P2d 106.

That case is commended to this

Court . for the detailed analysis of the law and for the
adoption

of

that

rule.

The

California

Court makes

an

interesting statement relative to the concept of gift. Page
121 of the citation:
There is no more reason to presume that services
are contributed as a gift than to presume that
funds are contributed as a gift; in any event,
the better approach is to presume, as Justice
Peters suggested, that 'the parties intended to
deal fairly with each other1. (Keene v. Keene,
supra, 57 Cal.2d 657, 674, 21 Cal.Rptr. 597,
603, 371 P.2d 329, 339 (dissenting opn.); see
Bruch, op. cit., supra,
Family L.Q.
,
.)

When examined under the concept of fairness, we find
that

Jacobsen

during

received

the relationship

all

of

after

the
its

property

accumulated

termination

and

brought suit for the balance, claiming it was a loan.

then
If

the Judgment is allowed to stand, he will have received
property valued at $27,200 -- Kimball, nothing.

There is no evidence to support the conclusion that the
$5,700 was a loan.
Mollie Kimball

testified

that when

the vehicle was

purchased, Jacobsen made no demand on her to pay the money
back.

She testified that she felt obligated to give him the
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money received from the sale of her older car and when she
received $2,800 for that car, she offered it to Jacobsen.
He said he didn't want it or didnft need it at that time,
and for her to put it in her credit union (TR 40 and TR 42).
The testimony on the subject is vague and inconclusive
as to the transaction being a loan.

There is nothing in

writing between the parties. Molliefs offer to pay did not
extend beyond the offer to pay the money received from the
sale of the old car and when in fact sold, Jacobsen rejected
the money and told her to deposit it in an account.
was three years before the relationship terminated.

This
During

that time, there is no testimony of a demand for payment and
no discussions concerning the automobile until this lawsuit
was filed over four years after the money had been advanced.
Considering

the circumstances

of the parties, being

virtually husband and wife, considering also the value of
services

received

by

Jacobsen

and

the

settlement

and

delivery of property values at the time the relationship
terminated, it is clear that the Court erred in finding the
purchase of the vehicle to be a loan.
POINT II; THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE VALUE
OF PROPERTY ACCUMULATED DURING THE RELATIONSHIP
AND THE VALUE OF SERVICES RENDERED PLAINTIFF BY
DEFENDANT.
Much of what is said here has been covered, in part,
under Point I.

Both Points have the same factual basis but
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should be considered separately because the legal principles
are somewhat distinct.
The Complaint filed in this case alleges a loan of
$5,700.00 to Defendant.

Defendant, in her Answer, denies

the loan and alleges affirmatively that the automobile was a
gift.
Exhibit 2, which shows the value of services rendered
to Jacobsen by Kimball during the relationship and the value
of other items of property given to her during the relationship was offered as an exhibit in the nature of an offset to
the claim of Jacobsen for $5,700.00, and also to show the
motivation of Jacobsen
Kimball.

in making

the vehicle a gift to

The Court admitted the exhibit but only for the

purpose of showing the motivation for gift, and not as an
offset

(Tr. 7).

On

the point

of offset, Mr. Marsden,

counsel for Jacobsen, said:
I think that's the key issue. I might
say the other issue from this exhibit is,
as I understand the position, although not
pled, they1re claiming an offset and that's
what — this is an itemization of living
expenses while this — these two people lived
together, as I understand it. I think it's
irrelevant, but that seems to be an issue
to be decided.
(Tr. 7)
The Court should have admitted Exhibit 2 as an offset as it
would in any domestic relations case under the equitable
powers

of

the

Court, particularly

when

counsel, albeit

reluctantly, agrees that it is an issue to be tried.
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There

is no

question

that

the Court was

given an

opportunity to consider these issues, which it refused to
do.

None of the equitable issues of a fair division of

property are addressed in the Courtfs Findings and Conclusions

(Record,

38-39).

The

Court was

given

a

further

opportunity to address these issues in Defendant's Motion to
Amend the Findings of Fact and Motion for New Trial (Record,
32-34) . The Court refused and entered an Order denying the
Motion

to Amend

and

the Motion

for New Trial

(Record,

46-47).
Although our courts have not considered the precise
issue of a fair division of property when parties live
together, the lower court was not entirely without precedent
in this matter.

In the Utah case of Jenkins vs. Jenkins,

153 P. 2d 262, the parties contracted a marriage at a time
when the divorce of the wife was interlocutory only and had
not become final.

The Supreme Court ruled that the later

marriage was void and not validated by continued cohabitation.

The defendant contended that the only power of the

lower court under those circumstances was to dismiss the
case.

The Supreme Court ruled to the contrary and said that

the lower court had the equitable power to provide for a
disposition of property and custody and support of the minor
child born to the parties.
Already addressed in Point I is the value of services
rendered

Jacobsen

by

Kimball

-14-

and

his

statement,

not

contraverted, that the property he purchased and gave or
delivered to her was done only with her in mind.
It was error for the Court not to make findings on
those issues which were clearly presented in the evidence.
Fairness would dictate that the Court below should have
considered

the matter

of

fairness, at

least

under

the

concept of gift set forth in the pleadings or, more precisely, under the concept of a fair division of property.
POINT III: THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS A BAR TO
THE ACTION (78-12-25).
The check for the car was written on February 8, 1981,
the car purchased that day.

Suit was brought by Jacobsen on

March 7, 1985, a period of time in excess of four years.
There is no comment in the Findings on the Statute of
Limitations defense.

In the Motion to Amend Findings and

Motion for New Trial, the Court was invited to address the
issue of when the Statute began to run.

It refused, denying

the Motions.
The evidence on this point is not in serious conflict
and

is

contained

Defendant.

in

the

testimony

of

Plaintiff

and

The best case Plaintiff can make on this point

is that on the date he purchased the vehicle for Mollie
Kimball, he did not set a time for payment and when Mollie
offered to pay, he simply stated, put the money in the
account, I'll let you know when I need it.

He stated this

again when he was offered the money from the old car that

-15-

had been sold.

It must be concluded that there was no

agreement as to repayment.
Cases construing similar situations have held that such
a loan is repayable immediately and the statute begins to
run on the date the loan was made.
These cases are collected in 14 A.L.R.4th 1385.

From

the annotation:
Thus, in the circumstances of the following
cases, the courts held or recognized that
statutes of limitation begin to run on
actions based on oral promises to pay
money, which did not contain provisions for
the time of repayment, from the date the
promises were made.
Plaintiff will direct the attention of the Court, as he
directed

the

lower

court,

Kounalis, 463 P. 2d 799

to

(Utah).

the

case

of

OfHair

vs.

In that case, suit was

commenced 5% years after the loan had been made and arrived
at the Supreme Court by way of summary judgment procedures.
The lower Court held that the action was barred by the
four-year statute.

The Supreme Court reversed for trial on

the merits to determine whether or not there was a loan,
whether the parties intended payments to be made at a future
time, whether a date of payment could be established, and
what constituted a reasonable time under the circumstances.
The plaintiff's version of the case which necessitated a
factual determination was that it was the intention of the
parties that repayment was to be made but was not to be made
for some number of years in the future.

-16-

Our case is clearly distinguishable.

In the O'Hair

case, money was to be repaid but not for some five years in
the future.
demanded.

In our case, there was to be no payment until

There is a vast conceptual difference between the

two types of cases.

Where a loan is made (Defendant denies

it was a loan), the lender has a right to set the terms and
if that lender simply states I'll let you know when I want
the money, it is a demand loan, the cause of action accrues
from when the loan is made, and the statute of limitations
begins to run on that date.
CONCLUSION
During
Defendant

the
lived

transactions

five-year
together,

between

them,

period

that

Plaintiff

there

were

a

such

as

an

and

number

$8,000.00

of

joint

account, the purchase of several items for investment, and
the purchase of a vehicle.

The appropriate decision in this

case would be for this Court to conclude that the return of
all

the

invested

items,

including

the

$8,000.00

joint

account, to Plaintiff was a fair settlement of property
rights and that the vehicle or its proceeds retained by
Plaintiff was

a fair

settlement

to her, which

in some

measure would compensate her for maintaining and paying for
all the groceries and expenses on a home of benefit to
Plaintiff.
On

the

other

hand,

if

the

Court

chooses

not

to

determine the case on the basis of equitable division of

-17-

property between these two people, then at all events, the
claim of Plaintiff for $5,700.00 is barred by the Four-Year
Statute of Limitations.

If that fails, the case should be

referred back to the lower Court for a new trial on the
various issues.
Respectfully submitted this >•"]

day of July, 1987.

GARRETT AND STURDY

'r*.

By

Edward M. Garrett

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the Y)

day of July, 1987,

four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Milo S. Marsden, Jr., Esq.
MARSDEN, ORTON & CAHOON
68 South Main Street
Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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